We examine the effects of independent directors on corporate R&D investments. The literature argues that managers have managerial myopia and tend to focus on short-term investments, and are less likely to make long-term investments such as R&D investments. Independent directors are reported to contribute to enhancing the interests of shareholders rather than those of management. A proportional increase in independent directors tends to strengthen the managerial monitoring process, which is expected to alleviate both managerial myopia and risk aversion. Therefore, independent directors are expected to lead long-term investments and R&D increases. In this paper, we find that independent directors are positively related to R&D investments, whereas firm size is negatively related to R&D investments. Firms holding much cash flows increase R&D investments. Independent directors are reported to have controlled managerial myopic and risk-averse investments in all periods of before and after the 2008 financial crisis.
본 연구는 다음의 모형에 대해 Pooled OLS 및 GLM 기법을 사용하여 분석한다. 
